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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1984, Congress effectuated a number of substantive changes to the
law of bankruptcy in the area of consumer credit with the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act.' One of the
most significant changes was section 707(b).2 This section allows the bankruptcy court to act either sua sponte or on the motion of the United States
Trustee to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse when the
case is filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer
debts. Section 707(b) currently reads as follows:

* Professor of Business Law, St. Cloud University. J.D., LL.M., The University
of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, St. Cloud University. J.D., Memphis
State University.
***Professor of Business Law, St. Cloud University. J.D., University of Minnesota.
I Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
2 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1989) (1986 amendment clarified that U.S.
Trustee could raise the issue of substantial abuse).
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After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on
a motion by the United States Trustee, but not at the request
or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed
by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are
primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief
would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter.
There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief
3
requested.
The introduction of section 707(b) to the bankruptcy code has raised many
difficult interpretational issues. 4 This article focuses on those issues concerning the implementation of section 707(b). Under the law, only the
courts and the U.S. Trustees are permitted to raise the issue of substantial
abuse. Therefore, to determine how section 707(b) is actually being administered, a survey was distributed to the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts and
the U.S. Trustees. The results of the survey are integrated into a discussion of the current status of the law and presented in this article. This
analysis identifies serious shortcomings with the law that can only be
remedied through congressional action. The article concludes with a proposal for solving the problems created by section 707(b).

II. SURVEY METHODOLOGY
As stated, the survey was designed to ascertain how section 707(b) is
being implemented by the Bankruptcy Courts and Trustees. To that end,
the survey contained questions designed to determine:
1. what procedure is being used to screen Chapter 7 petitions for potential substantial abuse;
2. what standards are being used to evaluate petitions for potential
substantial abuse; and
3. how often is 707(b) being used in the various bankruptcy districts.
The survey5 was sent to all the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, U.S. Trustees,
and Assistant U.S. Trustees. Eighty-three surveys were returned, yield-

3

Id.

4 These issues include: (1) What is the effect of a party in interest raising the

issue of substantial abuse?; (2) What is the appropriate definition of the phrase
"primarily consumer debts"?; (3) What circumstances would constitute substantial abuse?; (4) What is the effect of the presumption in favor of relief? See generally
Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow
Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59 (1986);
Proia, The Interpretation and Application of Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 93 Com. L. J. 367 (1988); Wells & Kurtz, A CriticalAnalysis of Bankruptcy
Code Section 707(b), 36 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385 (1988).
5 The survey instrument is attached as the Appendix.
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ing a total response rate of 45%.6 Specifically, 47% of the courts and 43%
of the U.S. Trustees 7 responded. This response rate represents a relatively
high rate of return for mailed questionnaires of this type without a second
mailing. 8 Before turning to the legal issues and survey results, the events
surrounding the enactment of section 707(b) are examined.
III. BACKGROUND

The passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act prompted the credit
industry to initiate a well coordinated lobbying effort to demonstrate that
the 1978 bankruptcy legislation made it too easy and profitable for an
individual to file bankruptcy.9 Indeed, the total number of bankruptcy
filings increased significantly after the adoption of the 1978 Act. In particular, the total number of non-business bankruptcy filings more than
doubled between 1978 and 1982 from 172,423 to 449,839.10 Thus, in re-

sponse to criticism leveled by the credit industry and the dramatic rise
in the number of consumer bankruptcy filings, Congress included a number of provisions relating to consumer credit in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.11 These provisions are often
referred to collectively as the "Consumer Credit Amendments" and include section 707(b).

12

The stated goals of the Consumer Credit Amendments were twofold:
(1) to decrease the number of personal bankruptcies; and (2) to foster the
availability of affordable consumer credit.13 While the overall purpose of
the Consumer Credit Amendments was clearly expressed, the same is not
true for section 707(b).14 The language of the section 707(b) is ambiguous
and the sparse legislative history contains conflicting statements of leg-

6 Survey Responses. The survey responses are on file at College of Business,
St. Cloud State University, St. Cloud, Minnesota.
I The response rate from the U.S. Trustees may have actually been higher
since trustees in a particular region may have collaborated and returned only
one response. Responses were received from 20 of the 25 regions. A survey was
sent to the Director and Counsel in the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee
Program; however, no reply was received.
8 H. Boyd, Jr., R. Westfall & S. Stasch, MARKETING RESEARCH (1989).
9 Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protectionfor Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO.
L. J. 1333 (1984). See also Black and Herbert, Bankcard's Revenge: A Critique of
the 1984 Consumers Credit Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. RICH. L.
REV. 845 (1985); Morris, Substantial Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 91 (1985).
10Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(1982). See also Breitowitz, New Developments in ConsumerBankruptcies:Chapter
7 Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse" (pts 1 & 2) 59 AM. BANKR. L. J.
327 (1985), 60 AM. BANKR. L. J. 33 (1986).
11Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
12 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1989).
13See generally, Wells and Kurtz, supra note 4, at 395.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 87-98.
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islative intent. As a result, the enactment of section 707(b) has raised
numerous questions which have yet to be resolved consistently by the
courts. The specific language and legislative history which pertains to
the implementation of section 707(b) is incorporated into the discussion
of the various issues.
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legislative History
When first enacted section 707(b) provided that only the court "on its own
motion and not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest"
could make a motion to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial
abuse. 15 The prohibition against a party in interest raising the issue of
substantial abuse was apparently included in the legislation to quell
concerns that creditors would routinely move for dismissals, thereby burdening debtors with the additional expense and time involved in demonstrating that Chapter 7 relief is appropriate.1 6 Senator Metzenbaum's
comments, as the Senate adopted the conference report, support this conclusion. He stated:
I also am extremely pleased that this bill prohibits creditors
from filing motions attempting to deny bankruptcy relief to
individuals because of substantial abuse. If a creditor asks a
court to dismiss a case claiming that there has been substantial
abuse [of the bankruptcy laws by the debtor, the court would
not be] allowed to do so. Only a bankruptcy court, acting on
its own initiative, could dismiss a case involving substantial
abuse. This will preclude creditors from making bankruptcy
too expensive for the debtor by filing harassing motions alleg17
ing substantial abuse.

"Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2606 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 707 (West Supp. 1989)).
6These concerns were expressed when an earlier version of the law was being
considered which allowed creditors to challenge Chapter 7 filings. S. REP. No.
446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-53 (1982) (minority views of Senators Metzenbaum
and Kennedy). Despite this concern, a few courts have noted that creditors often
fail to participate once a motion to dismiss is made by the court or U.S. Trustee.
The most vivid example is in the case of In re Wegner, 91 Bankr. 854 (Bankr. D.
Minn 1988). Therein the debtors owed $123,129 to more than twenty-six unsecured creditors. Notice of the § 707(b) motion was given to each creditors; however,
not one responded. This prompted the court to conclude that the creditors must

consider bankruptcies just another cost of doing business to be passed along to
other consumers in the form of higher interest rates. Id. at 856 n.3.
17130 CONG. REC. S7624-25, (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
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Subsequently, a question arose as to whether U.S. Trustees and panel
trustees were "parties in interest." Some courts had held that trustees
could not make motions or bring information to the courts' attention on
the issue of substantial abuse. 8 These decisions prompted Congress, in
1986, to amend section 707(b) to specifically state that the U.S. Trustee
could raise the issue of substantial abuse. But again, such motions may
not be at the request or suggestion of any party in interest. Congress'
intent to preclude creditors from raising the issue of substantial abuse
is evidenced by the legislative history of the 1986 Amendment. Representative Fish, one of the legislative managers of the amendment, commented on the floor that, "the 'party in interest' phrase in section 707(b)
was intended to mean creditors.
-19 and the House Conference Report
on the amendment noted that the "original intent ... was to preclude
creditors from exercising this function [bringing information on substan'20
tial abuse to the court's attention]."
B. Implementation
As amended section 707(b) provides for the courts and the U.S. Trustees
to raise the issue of substantial abuse. The statutory language, as well
as the legislative intent, are clear in that only the court or U.S. Trustee
is empowered to make motions to dismiss Chapter 7 cases for substantial
abuse. Accordingly, the courts have readily rejected motions by creditors
to dismiss a case for substantial abuse. For example, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in the case of In Re Christianaffirmed the bankruptcy
court's decision that a creditor lacks standing to move for dismissal by
simply stating that the statute is plain and unequivocal on its face and
21
creditors cannot make section 707(b) motions.
Consequently, it is up to the courts and U.S. Trustees to guard against
substantial abuse of the bankruptcy process by debtors. The courts, however, are not screening Chapter 7 cases for substantial abuse. Eighty-five
percent of the courts that responded to the survey stated that they had
not implemented a process to screen Chapter 7 cases for possible substantial abuse. In explanation, four themes emerged: the lack of time;
concern as to the role of ajudge; reliance on the U.S. Trustee; and objection
to a screening process.

22

IS See, e.g., In re Christian, 51 Bankr. 118 (D.N.J. 1985) (trustee is a party in
interest and therefore cannot raise § 707(b)), affd, 804 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986) (on

appeal the issue of whether U.S. Trustee has standing to file motions under §
707(b) was not decided).

19132 CONG. REC. H9000-9001 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
20 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 46-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5246, 5247-8.
21 804 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986). See also In re Lord, 93 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1988); In re Young, 92 Bankr. 782 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
22Survey Responses, supra note 6.
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With regard to the time involved in implementing section 707(b), one
court simply stated that "the caseloads are such that the Court does not
have the time to police this process.

' 23

A more vivid description comes

from another judge who complains, "[w]e have 4,000 new filings per judge.
...I held court 17 1/2 workdays per month for the last two years. Staff
works 6 days a week now - who do you suggest 'screen Chapter 7 schedules?'" This court then added, "[c]ourts with nothing to do must appreciate this job.

'24

More significantly, a number of judges expressed concern with being
asked to raise the issue of substantial abuse. They questioned whether
the task is consistent with their role as a judge - whether it is appropriate
for a court to raise the issue of substantial abuse and then rule on that
motion. The following responses are illustrative of this concern.
[Tihere seems to be something inherently unfair in the Court
being the prosecutor, judge and jury when a § 707(b) motion is
filed and heard. As one debtor said at the start of a hearing
'[h]aven't you already decided there is a violation or the motion
would not have been filed?'
[o]ur court does not act [s]ua [s]ponte in § 707(b) matters as
we decided that doing this would make the court an inquisitor
and something other than the impartial adjudicator
envisioned
25
by the framers of the Bankruptcy Code.
These concerns even prompted Judge Yacos in the case of In re
Keniston26 to question the constitutionality of section 707(b). Interestingly, in Keniston the court ordered a section 707(b) hearing and then
sua sponte raised the constitutionality of such an order. Specifically, the
issue was whether section 707(b) denies the procedural due process of law
requirement of an impartial and fair tribunal since the bankruptcy judge
initiates a substantial abuse hearing and then decides if bankruptcy relief
should be afforded.2 7 Although this court as well as the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals 28 has ruled that this aspect of the statute is constitutionally valid, the survey results demonstrate that a number of courts
are simply not willing to raise the issue of substantial abuse sua sponte.

23

Id.

Additional responses include:
"I believe that a judge's job is to judge, not investigate, administer, or become
an advocate."
"From a personal standpoint, I felt there was a glitch in the law when it
was first written several years ago [allowing only the court to make § 707(b)
motions]. It required the court to act as the investigator, grand jury, prosecutor and then 'impartial' judge in a § 707(b) proceeding." Id.
25Id.

Bankr. 742 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986).
85 Bankr. 202, 204 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).

2660

21In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1988).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss1/4

6

1991]

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

21

The most common reason given by the courts for not having implemented a screening process for substantial abuse is that the function is
performed by the U.S. Trustee. 29 In fact, 60% of these courts indicate that
they rely exclusively upon the U.S. Trustee to monitor Chapter 7 cases
for substantial abuse. Many courts are of the opinion that the responsibility for initiating section 707(b) motions now lies with the U.S. Trustee.
For example, the courts made the following comments.
As a result of the 1986 Amendments to § 707(b) the court views
the screening of Chapter 7 petitions to be the responsibility of
the U.S. Trustee.
Because 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) permits the United States Trustee
to file motions to dismiss for substantial abuse, the screening
and monitoring of Chapter 7 cases for substantial
abuse is done
30
by the United States Trustee in this district.
Many courts even forwarded the survey to the U.S. Trustee to complete.
The most interesting responses in this area came from those judges who
had initially implemented a screening process but subsequently turned
the responsibility for the process over to the U.S. Trustee. One judge
wrote,
Upon certification, the United States Trustee Program has
taken over the screening process with regard to substantial
abuse in Chapter 7 cases. While we are unsure of the exact
criteria, we know they at least began with this court's previously established criteria for § 707(b) review. Our criteria involved analyzing the debtor's gross annual income in relation
to the debtor's total unsecured debt. However, the court has
always felt it imprudent to reveal the exact standards.2 1
Another court disclosed that they had screened Chapter 7 petitions on
the basis of monthly net income. In fact, the availability of $100 in
monthly net income had prompted a further examination of possible substantial abuse. Yet, this court also ceased reviewing Chapter 7 petitions
in favor of the U.S. Trustee. 32 A third court indicated that it still reviews
Chapter 7 cases but if the established criteria is met, the case is forwarded
to the U.S. Trustee for further action. 3
Since the statutory language and legislative intent clearly provide that
both the court and the U.S. Trustee may raise the issue of substantial
abuse, it is interesting that so many courts have completely delegated
the responsibility to the U.S. Trustee. For some courts, reliance upon the
U.S. Trustee is a way to avoid the conflict they perceive between sua
sponte motions and the judicial role as a neutral party. The following
comments demonstrate this point.
I Survey Responses, supra note 6.

30ld.
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
1d.
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I felt Congress realized the awkward, if not untenable, position
the courts were put in [in being asked to raise substantial abuse
sua sponte] and brought the U.S. Trustee into the equation.
•.. In the Middle District... we now have a U.S. Trustee. The
U.S. Trustee can allege a violation of § 707(b) to a court that
has no predisposition about the case. The court can listen to
the witnesses presented by the U.S. Trustee and the debtor,
consider the evidence, and determine whether the statutory
sanctions are appropriate. This also allows the U.S. Trustee to
handle the case on appeal if necessary which is another void
if the court brings its own "motion".
[I]t is a function of the U.S. Trustee to do this [screen chapter
7 petitions for substantial abuse] and we don't feel the court
should be doing it.
[A] judges job is to judge.... Therefore, if the local U.S. Trustee
desires to apprise the court of cases in which there may exist
substantial abuse, I will consider the matter34contested and it
will be scheduled for an evidentiary hearing.
Another explanation is that the U.S. Trustees are performing the function to the satisfaction of the courts. One judge wrote: "I find that when
U.S. Trustee
a matter is in fact appropriate for 707(b) consideration the '35
A different
take.
to
is available to take whatever action he/she wishes
guidelines
establishing
considering
court stated that it is not currently
ad"adequately
have
Trustees
the
because
to screen Chapter 7 cases
"
court
a
line
this
Along
"36
7
Chapter
under
situations
dressed any abuse
responded,
No consideration is being given by the Court to implement a
screening process. The U.S. Trustee is going to be given an
opportunity to implement an appropriate screening process
through the use of the Chapter 7 trustees. .... We will then

in37
evaluate whether the Court needs to take any initiative
the U.S. Trustee.
raising 707(b) issues not otherwise raised by
However, not all courts are enthusiastic about the U.S. Trustee. One
court stated, "I would further add that in the one year the U.S. Trustee
has been certified by this District, its office has been no help concerning
38
section 707(b) issues," while another court noted that it has "no confi39
dence in the U.S. Trustee.

- Survey Responses, supra note 6.
SId.
- Id.
37Id.

3s Id.

- Survey Responses, supra note 6.
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The final idea to emerge from those courts which responded that they
had not implemented a screening process, is that Congress did not intend
the courts to implement a screening process. In a letter one judge explained his thoughts as follows.
I am aware that some have criticized judges who have not
created screening procedures such as those which are the subject of your survey and have suggested that they have cavalierly disregarded the law. Because I do not believe such
criticism to be fair and personally doubt the appropriateness
of such screening, a further response to your survey is warranted
I, of course, am aware that a number of judges thereupon construed the passage of the provision to provide a license to set
up screening procedures and divine standards of eligibility;
indeed, some appear to believe that it was a mandate to do so.
I, on the other hand, believed and continue to believe that the
provision initially was the net result of an effort by a special
interest group to introduce a threshold test for consumer debtors, which effort was successfully sabotaged in the legislative
40
process.
Another judge wrote, "[a] judge's second guessing, or automatically holding 707(b) hearings on every Chapter 7 case is not what Congress wanted.
The sua sponte provision was put in to provide the mechanism should the
need to use it arise" and a different court noted that "Congress did not
41
provide for a screening process.."
While the survey results establish that the bankruptcy courts, for the
most part, are not screening Chapter 7 cases for substantial abuse, the
survey found that the U.S. Trustees have undertaken the function. Every
Trustee that answered the survey indicated that they have implemented
a screening process to identify possible substantial abuse in Chapter 7
cases, with the exception of three replies which explained that their offices
had just recently opened. Thus unlike the majority of courts, the U.S.
Trustees have interpreted section 707(b) as a mandate to screen Chapter
7 cases for substantial abuse. As one U.S. Trustee commented:
The U.S. Trustee, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 586(a) has a duty to
supervise the administration of cases under Title 11. As the
legislative history seems to discourage active creditor participation under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), the U.S. Trustee and the Court
must fill the void. While this process creates an enormous new
to be the
responsibility for the U.S. Trustee the review appears
42
only way to adequately address this problem area.

40/d.
41

42

Id.
Id.
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Indeed, one U.S. Trustee even indicated that the detection and prosecution
43
of section 707(b) is a priority of the U.S. Trustee program.
The survey also revealed that the U.S. Trustees have employed a wide
variety of procedures in screening Chapter 7 petitions. Some U.S. Trustees
rely exclusively upon the panel trustees to review Chapter 7 petitions for
substantial abuse. 44 Within this approach, some U.S. Trustees have given
the panel trustees guidelines for identifying of substantial abuse; whereas
others have left the ascertainment of substantial abuse up to the panel
trustee. One U.S. Trustee wrote, "ilt is believed guidelines result in a
rigid application that is inappropriate to this area of law." 45 This partic-

ular U.S. trustee disseminates information on new developments in section 707(b) to the panel trustees but expects them "to know the law, follow
it and bring judgement calls to the attention of the United States Trus46

t ee.

Many U.S. Trustee offices conduct their own review of Chapter 7 petitions. 47 Some of these offices review every petition while others examine
only a sample. The person who actually conducts the review varies from
office to office. In a few offices, the U.S Trustee or the Assistant U.S.
Trustee screens the petitions, while in others this function is performed
by either the attorney, paralegal, bankruptcy analyst or legal clerk. 4
With so many different people reviewing Chapter 7 petitions for substantial abuse, it seems obvious that the results of the screening will
differ between the various offices of the United States Trustees. Moreover,
the particular personality of the person scrutinizing the petitions will
impact upon the identification of substantial abuse. One trustee specifically referred to this concern, stating:
[T]he panel trustees have not been consistent in either identifying or pursuing cases of substantial abuse. The cases which
we receive from the various trustees reflect the fact that each
trustee has his or her own standards for substantial abuse with
the result that there is little consistency in the types of cases
referred to this Office.

49

C. Creditor Involvement
As discussed above, motions to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse may only be made by the court or the U.S. Trustee. Beyond
this requirement, the law provides that such motions may not be at the
request or suggestion of any party in interest. Thus, a question arises as
to what happens when there is creditor involvement.

43 Id.

-Survey Responses, supra note 6.

45Id.

-Id.
47Id.
48Id.

19Survey Responses, supra note 6.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss1/4
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The courts have refused to consider suggestions by creditors to dismiss
0
a case pursuant to section 707(b). In the case of In re Campbell,6 a creditor
filed a document entitled "Suggestions of Lawrence National in Opposition to Discharge." The court noted that the suggestions "were filed, not
as an adversary action, not as a motion, but apparently as an assistance
to the Court in the event that the Court would otherwise fail to recognize
the signal flags of substantial abuse."51 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the statute and congressional intent were clear - the court could
3
52
not consider the suggestions of the bank. In the case of In re Clark the
Trustee.
U.S.
the
idea of dismissal under section 707(b) was presented to
Therein a creditor wrote to the U.S. Trustee outlining its position that
the case constituted substantial abuse and requested that the U.S. Trustee
54
consider filing a motion to dismiss. The U.S. Trustee made the motion
yet admitted at the hearing that it was generated exclusively by the
creditor's request. 5 After reviewing the law, the court found that the
"statute, in very clear and unambiguous language, states that such mo56
tion cannot be 'at the request or suggestion of any party in interest'."
Thus, since the U.S. Trustee's motion was "inspired solely" by the creditor,
it was dismissed. 57 A more troublesome issue is whether a motion or
suggestion by a party in interest forecloses the court or the U.S. Trustee
8
from raising the issue of substantial abuse. The court in In re Hudson
stated:
While it appears that the provisions of Section 707(b) should
be given their ordinary and plain meaning, to do so is to present
the Court with a practical difficulty in the event a party-ininterest should bring a case to the Court's attention. On one
hand, the Court may not act pursuant to Section 707(b) if a
case has been brought to its attention by a party-in-interest.
On the other hand, the Court cannot ignore information which
has been brought before it, regardless of how the information
was obtained. If a rule were devised, whereby a court could not
act pursuant to Section 707(b) if a case was called to the Court's
attention by a party-in-interest, such a rule would have a deterrent effect on the parties who would otherwise make this
information available. However, it would also have the effect
of preventing the Court from acting in cases where59an abuse
of Title 11 Chapter 7 is most likely to be occurring.

"63 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
81

Id. at 703.

at 705.
100 Bankr. 821 (Bankr. W.D. Va.).
l4d. at 825.
11Id. at 825.

52Id.

56Id. at 823.

11Id. at 824.
"156 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
19Id. at 420.
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The court opined that if faced with the choice of overlooking the fact
that a party in interest has raised the issue of substantial abuse or the
possibility of substantial abuse, public policy and equity require a court
to pursue a section 707(b) dismissal.6°
This same approach was taken by the court in In re Campbell.61Therein,
the issue was couched as follows: "do

. ..

suggestions [by parties in in-

terest] poison the process, so that any independent investigation by the
Court is tainted and would constitute what in criminal practice parlance
would be termed 'fruit of the poison tree'. 6 2 The court ruled that the
creditor's suggestions did not preclude the court from making an independent finding that the case constitutes substantial abuse., 3 The court
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would defeat the general spirit of
the Bankruptcy Code and discourage creditors from participating in the
process.6 The court stated:
Public policy which this Court understands to be that honest
debtors should have a fresh start would not be served by saying
that a debtor who has abused the process should be rewarded
as a result of an overzealous act upon the part of a good faith
creditor. The court is put in mind of the old adage that "Two
wrongs do not make a right". If the debtor has abused the
system or its spirit the sin of the creditor in pointing it out
does not make the debtor's act proper.6 5
Thus, the court disregarded the creditor's suggestions to dismiss, but
reviewed the case for substantial abuse. 66
One of the most definitive cases to take the public policy/equite justification of review for substantive abuse position is In re Busbin.67 In this
case, the debtor argued that the U.S. Trustee's motion to dismiss pursuant
to section 707(b) should be denied because it was brought and is being
prosecuted at the instigation of a creditor. Indeed, following the section
707(b) hearing, the U.S. Trustee joined in the brief of a creditor instead
of filing its own.- The court rejected the debtor's argument. After paraphrasing from the Hudson decision, 69 the court held, "[b]oth the court and
the U.S. Trustee have a duty to independently evaluate any information

60

Id.
6163 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
62 Id. at 704.
"IId.at 705.
4 Id.
- Id.

63 Bankr. 702, 706 (Bankr. W. D. Mo. 1986).
Bankr. 240 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).

67 95

6Id. at 241.
69 Although this

court reached the same conclusion as in Hudson, it appears
from the paraphrasing that the reasoning employed in Hudson was misunderstood.
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'70
which may be brought to light by a party in interest. According to the
court, this independent "screening process will prevent the abuse of secseeking to use it as a means of harassing or
tion 707(b) by creditors
71

intimidating debtors."

However, there is not unanimous agreement with these decisions. Collier, a noted authority on bankruptcy, writes:
The substantial abuse issue must be raised by the court or by
the Unitea States trustee ... and 'not at the request or sug-

gestion of any party in interest.' Apparently if a party in interest does raise the substantial abuse issue the court may not
hear it. Moreover, it is likely that once a party in interest raises
the issue in a case, the court may not subsequently raise the
same issue because it was initially suggested by a party in
interest. This precludes creditors from filing harassing motions
that would increase the expense of a bankruptcy case or from
seeking dismissal after losing a discharge or dischargeability
action.

72

73
This was the opinion of the court in the case of In re Latimer. Therein,
urged
then
a creditor moved to dismiss the case under section 707(a) and
74
The
inquisition.
707(b)
the court to transpose the motion into a section
foreand
proceeding
the
tainted
suggestion
creditor's
the
that
court held
75
closed a section 707(b) dismissal on the merits. The court reasoned that
"if a court could transform a section 707(a) motion into a section 707(b)type inquiry, the limitation on creditor-initiation expressly provided for
76
in section 707(b) would be eviscerated.
77
The court in In re Restea also appears to have adopted this view. Here
the suggestion to dismiss the case as substantial abuse was made to the
78
Chapter 7 trustee during the first meeting of creditors. In moving to
dismiss the case for substantial abuse, the U.S. Trustee did not controvert
that its motion was at the request or suggestion of creditors but claimed
that requests or suggestions are proper if made to the Chapter 7 trustee
79
during the first meeting of creditors. After reviewing the law, the role
of the Chapter 7 trustee and the purpose of the first meeting of creditors,
the court decided that "[s]ection 707(b) clearly conditions a dismissal
motion on an independent and uninfluenced review by the Chapter 7
trustee who then presents his/her findings to the United States Trustee's
office for further action." 80 The court thought that to allow creditors to

7095

Bankr. at 242.

71Id.

4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1979) § 707.05 at 707-14-15.
Bankr. 354 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
74
72

7382

Id.

75Id. at
76

363.
1d. at 362.
7776 Bankr. 728 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987).
78Id. at 730-31.
79Id. at 732.
0Id. at 733.
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suggest or request dismissal at the first meeting of creditors would render
the statutory language meaningless and result in debtor harassment.,"
Therefore, the court denied the U.S. Trustee's motion to dismiss the case
2
because it was at the request or suggestion of a party in interest.
The language in this case is very expansive. The holding infers that
once a creditor suggests or requests dismissal under section 707(b), the
issue can no longer be raised. However, after reading the decision it is
questionable whether the court would have been persuaded to allow the
motion had the U.S. Trustee argued that he disregarded the creditor's
suggestion and conducted an independent investigation.
The survey results indicate that a creditor's request or suggestion to
dismiss a petition under section 707(b), generally does not prevent an
independent investigation by the U.S. Trustee into whether the case
constitutes substantial abuse. 3 A few courts have openly acknowledged
creditor participation in initiating section 707(b) motions. One court
stated that they had not implemented a screening process since the "Chapter 7 Trustees and counsel for the creditors have adequately addressed
any abuse situations under Chapter 7. ''84 Another court commented that
"at 341 meetings creditors can and often do raise, I am told, 707(b) questions, if applicable." 85 Moreover, in response to a survey question that
asked what is the result "if a creditor brings the possibility of substantial
abuse to the attention of the trustee," the predominant response of U.S.
Trustees indicated that an independent investigation is conducted to determine if a motion to dismiss should be made.8 6
V. SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE

A. Legislative History
In enacting section 707(b), one concern was consumer debtors with the
ability to repay their debts were unfairly taking advantage of bankruptcy
to obtain a discharge of indebtedness. The primary basis for the concern
was a consumer bankruptcy study (Purdue Study) conducted by the Credit
Research Center located at the Krannert Graduate School of Management
at Purdue University which concluded that a substantial minority of
8 7
consumers who file for Chapter 7 have considerable debt-paying ability.
However, a review of the legislative history provides conflicting evidence

81Id.
82

In re Restea, 76 Bankr. at 733.
Survey Responses, supra note 6.

'Id.

Id.
Id.
17 Credit Research Center, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, Consumer Bankruptcy Study (1982). See also S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7-14 (1982).
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as to whether section 707(b) includes a "future income test." Early versions of what eventually became section 707(b) specifically provided that
Chapter 7 relief would be unavailable to individuals who could 88pay a
reasonable portion of their debts out of anticipated future earnings. This
"future income test" was severely criticized by Senators Kennedy and
Metzenbaum.8 9 As a result of this opposition, a compromise was reached
that deleted the "future-income" language and replaced it with a provision
permitting the court to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition upon a showing of
substantial abuse ° At this juncture, a number of Senators, including
Senator Metzenbaum, believed that91the "future income test" had been
completely eliminated from the bill. However, the Senate Report indicated otherwise. It concluded that if a debtor could meet his debts without
difficulty as they came due, use of Chapter 7 would be considered substantial abuse.

92

This brings us to the bill as finally enacted. The legislative history is
sparse and contradictory. During the House debate, many Congressmen
indicated that a "future income test" was intended. Representative Daub
remarked:

H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

8S.REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-53 (1982) (dissenting views). Senator
...
Metzenbaum stated that the future income language "would have made it
more difficult for the debtor to go bankrupt and it would have provided a mortgage
on his or her future." 129 CONG. REc. S5361 (daily ed. April 27, 1983).
9 S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

The "substantial abuse" language contained in these bills is substantially similar

to § 707(b) as enacted.
91 1290 CONG. REc. 9,973 (1983).
S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The report summarized the
section of the bill concerning dismissal for substantial abuse as follows:
This provision represents a balancing of two interests. It preserves the
fundamental concept embodied in our bankruptcy laws that debtors who
cannot meet debts as they come due should be able to relinquish non-exempt
property in exchange for a fresh start. At the same time, however, it upholds

creditors' interests in obtaining repayment where such repayment would
not be a burden.

Crushing debt burdens and severe financial problems place enormous

strains on borrowers and their families. Family life, personal emotional
health, or work productivity often suffers. By enabling individuals who
cannot meet their debts to start a new life, unburdened with debt they
cannot pay, the bankruptcy law allows troubled borrowers to become pro-

such
ductive members of their communities. Nothing in this bill denies
Chapter
under
relief
bankruptcy
burdens
debt
unaffordable
with
borrowers
7. However, if a debtor can meet his debt without difficulty as it comes due,
use of Chapter 7 would represent a substantial abuse.
Id. at 54.
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The basic problem with the 1978 law ...that we seek to correct
...is the fact that credit is granted on a prospective basis, that
is one's future earnings are considered in providing the credit.
All we are asking is that when debts are discharged the same
analysis be allowed instead of the current process whereby a
93
snapshot of sorts is taken of the debtor's financial position ....
Representative Anderson stated, "a bankruptcy court could dismiss a
[Clhapter 7 filing if, in its opinion, the filing constitutes a 'substantial
abuse' of the Bankruptcy Code because the debtor is found capable of
fulfilling the terms of a [C]hapter 13 repayment agreement. '94
However, as the conference report was adopted by the Senate, Senator
Metzenbaum stated that: "[b]oth the House and Senate have agreed to
the total elimination of the future income language ....[t]he availability

of bankruptcy relief would not be limited by a future earnings standard. '95
In Senator Metzenbaum's opinion, to have included a "future income test":
[W]ould... force bankruptcy judges to become soothsayers and
engage in the impossible task of predicting someone's earnings
and financial obligations. Bankruptcy relief would.., become
hostage to a judge's guesses about how much an individual
would earn, what their financial burdens would be, whether
they would become sick, unemployed, and so on. In some cases,
because judges are human, they simply would be wrong.9 6
Chairman Rodino also clearly stated, during consideration of the conference report in the House, that the provision contained no threshold or
"future income test. 97
Obviously, these contradictions in stated legislative intent have forced
the courts and U.S. Trustees to attempt to fashion a reasonable definition
of what constitutes substantial abuse with little guidance from the legislative record. Not surprisingly, there are three general approaches: (1)
use the future income test as the only criterion to determine substantial
abuse; (2) use the future income test as one of several criteria; and (3)
on occasion dismiss for substantial abuse without applying a future income test.98

93130 CONG. REC. 6,217 (1984); see also Id. at 6,205 (remarks of Rep. Brooks);
Id. (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); Id. at 6,225-26 (remarks of Rep. Anthony); Id.
at 6,225 (remarks of Rep. Brown). However after the debate, Chairman Rodino
had inserted into the CongressionalRecord that the substantial abuse provision
"would not create a future income test." 130 CONG. REC. 6,504 (1984).
130 CONG. REc. 20,233 (1984).
11130 CONG. REC. 17,158 (1984).
6

D Id.

130 CONG. REc. 20,224 (1984).
"ISee infra notes 99-177 & accompanying text.
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B. Exclusive Future Income Test
The two most significant cases to date on the question of what constitutes substantial abuse have used future income as the sole determinant
of substantial abuse. Both the Ninth Circuit in the case of In re Kelly99
and the Eighth Circuit in In re Walton'00 have taken the position that
ability to pay, standing alone, constitutes substantial abuse.
The Kelly court held that "a finding that a debtor is able to pay his
debts, standing alone, supports a conclusion of substantial abuse."'' 1 In
reaching this decision, the court examined portions of the legislative
history and found that this approach was "fully in keeping with Congress's
intent in enacting section 707(b).'' 10 2 According to the court, the state-

ments by Senator Metzenbaum and Representative Rodino that section
707(b) does not include a future income test, referred to the fact that the
legislation no longer contained a formula for determining whether a
debtor has the ability to pay. 10 3 These comments, in the court's opinion,
did not suggest that the ability to pay is irrelevant when considering
substantial abuse.11 In addition, the circuit court concluded that the
overwhelming majority of courts that had addressed the issue adopted
this approach. 0 5 Consequently, the circuit court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's dismissal of Kelly's petition solely on the basis that after reducing
recreation expenses to $250, approximately 99 percent of the unsecured
10 6
debt could be repaid out of disposable income in three years.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Walton agreed with the reasoning and result of Kelly. The debtor in Walton argued that substantial
abuse equates to bad faith and that Chapter 7 remains available to "any
debtor who demonstrates 'meaningful economic hardship'."' 0 7 The circuit
court disagreed with this interpretation. According to the circuit court,
since the enactment of section 707(b), "debtors no longer have unfettered
access to voluntary Chapter 7 relief."'' 08 In reaching this conclusion, the

841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).

100866
101841

F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989).
F.2d at 915.

102Id.

"03
Id. at 914.
104Id.

'OrId. Despite reaching this conclusion, only three bankruptcy court decisions
were cited: In re Cord, 68 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re Hudson, 56
Bankr. 415 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985); and while the authors would have added In re Bell, 56 Bankr.
637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1986), it is difficult to agree with the assessment in Kelly
that this is an overwhelming majority. Since the circuit court decisions, a number
of bankruptcy courts have adopted this approach. See, e.g., In re Herbst, 95 Bankr.
98 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.); In re Rushing, 93 Bankr. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988).
'0 Id. at 915.
M

107

866 F.2d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1989).

111 Id. at 982.
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circuit court noted that the consumer credit amendments, which includes
section 707(b), "were aimed primarily at stemming the use of Chapter 7
relief by unneedy debtors."'10 9 Thus, the court reasoned that to accept the
debtor's interpretation of substantial abuse would "drastically reduce the
bankruptcy courts' ability to dismiss cases filed by debtors who are not
dishonest, but who also are not needy." 110
With regard to the specific legislative history of section 707(b), the
court stated "[w]e believe that in deleting the mandatory future income
threshold formula, Congress simply replaced a rigid test with a flexible
'substantial abuse' standard that does not foreclose the courts from considering, inter alia, the debtor's ability to pay his debts out of his future
income."'1 Furthermore, the circuit court felt that if substantial abuse
was construed to mean bad faith, section 707(b) would add nothing to the
Code because other sections have always required petitioners to file in
good faith. 112 In support of this decision, the court noted that "almost all
the courts that have interpreted the 'substantial abuse' language of section 707(b) have concluded that this language encompasses consideration
of the debtor's ability to pay his debts out of future income" and that
"consideration of future income follows the analysis favored by most bank13
ruptcy commentators."' '
After having decided that future income could be considered in determining substantial abuse, the circuit court, relying exclusively on the
Kelly decision concluded that ability to pay, with nothing more, constitutes substantial abuse. Thus, since Walton's surplus income of $497 per
month could pay off more than two-thirds of his debts under a three-year
plan or 100 percent in five years, the circuit court affirmed 4the district
court's dismissal of Walton's petition as substantial abuse."1
From the survey, only one court indicated that it had at one time
implemented a screening process based exclusively on ability to pay. Chief
Judge Dennis J. Stewart from the Western District of Missouri had established numerical guidelines for issuing show cause orders as to why
the Chapter 7 petition should not be dismissed as substantial abuse within
the meaning of section 707(b)." 5 Under the screening process, the court

10 Id. at 983.

110
Id.
"IIn re Walton,866 F.2d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1989).
112Id.

"3 Id. at 984.
114d. at 985.
"5 Survey Responses, supra note 6. Although many judges and U.S. Trustees

signed the survey, Chief Judge Stewart is the only person who is specifically
referred to in this article. We have identified Chief Judge Stewart because the
screening process was made public in the case of In re Antal, 74 Bankr. 8, 8 n. 1
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). Moreover, it seemed appropriate to attribute the comments to Chief Judge Stewart since the circuit court in Walton specifically endorsed his interpretation of § 707(b). Id. See infra text accompanying notes 120123.
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issued a show cause order if the debtor's monthly net expenses exceeded
$1,000 for single debtors or $2,000 in the case of married debtors. 1 6 The
dollar figures were the result of the court "estimating the amount which
would be necessary, under local conditions, to sustain a single person over
a 30-day period and how much it would take to sustain two-, three- and
four-member families.""' 7 With regard to the screening process, Chief
Judge Stewart commented:
[I]t was may belief that, while they were utilized, the guidelines
were very successful and prevented the abuse which it seems
to me that § 707(b) was designed to prevent, namely the utilizing of bankruptcy to rid ones' self of a few-usually credit
card- unsecured debts even as the facts reflected a full ability
to pay the debts sought to be discharged." 8
This approach has been discussed here because it seems probable that
such a screening process will be reinstated. The screening process was
discontinued when Chief Judge Stewart was forced, because of a district
court decision, 1 9 to conclude in the case of In re Antal"20 that "section
707(b) is a dead letter."'12 In a footnote to Walton, the circuit court specifically referred to Antal and disagreed with the conclusion.122 Moreover,
the circuit court referred to an earlier opinion of Judge Stewart, wherein
the Chapter 7 petition was dismissed under section 707(b) because the
debtor could fund a Chapter 13 plan and stated that this "represents the
correct view of the law." 123 Thus, Chief Judge Stewart now has the support

of the circuit court to screen Chapter 7 cases on the basis of ability to
pay.
Moreover, 30% of the U.S. Trustee offices that responded to the survey
indicated that ability to pay is the sole criterion used to screen Chapter
7 petitions for substantial abuse." 4 The following statements describe
some of the processes employed.

"I Survey Responses, supra note 6. While not specified, it appears that the
court added some dollar amount to these figures for each dependent. Note that
these guidelines were only for issuing show cause orders. The court highlighted
the fact that "[in many cases, expenses exceeding the guidelines were approved,
after a hearing, based on the facts of the individual case." Id.
117
Id.
116
Id.
"19
In re Brady, 86 Bankr. 616 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). The district court ruled
that the case should not be dismissed as substantial abuse because although the
debtor could repay her unsecured creditors under a Chapter 13 plan, her monthly
income, social security, is exempt property.
12085 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). The court concluded that no debtor
will have the ability to pay creditors if only non-exempt property is considered.
121Id.
122866 F.2d 981, 984 n.7 (8th Cir. 1989).
123 Id.
124 Survey Responses, supra note 6.
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Our office reviews every Debtor's schedules, statement of affairs, and statement of income and expenditures to determine
if, from a purely mathematical approach, Debtor could repay
a significant portion of his/her unsecured and undersecured
debt over a three (3) year period.
Upon entering the petition data into the computer, the Paralegal checks the income + expense statement. If income exceeds expenses by more than $200 per month, further
investigation occurs. [The U.S. trustee utilizes this procedure]
because the Walton case in the 8th Circuit has held that income
between $200-$400 in excess of expenses constitutes substantial abuse.
The schedule of current income and expenditures is examined
as to reasonableness and disposable income. If it appears there
is sufficient income to complete a 100% Chapter 13 Plan in
three years, the debtor is questioned at the Section 341 meeting
of creditors as to financial condition and as to accuracy of the
budget. If there is sufficient evidence of substantial abuse, the
U.S. Trustee files a Motion to Dismiss. The review is limited
is made as
to 3-year 100-percent plans until a determination 125
to the Court's view of 707(b) cases in this district.
25Id. Additional responses include:
When the petitions are received in this office, the first step taken is to
review each petition for substantial abuse. The main review I take in reviewing a petition for 707(b) is looking at the Currant [sic] Income and
Expense Sheet. If the income looks as though it exceeds $500.00 I run a
calculater [sic] tape subtracting the expenses from the income. If the disposable income is in excess of $500.00 I then multiply that figure by 36
months (the minimum amount of months under chapter 13). After I get that
figure, I go to the Summary of Property and Debts and I divide the amount
of unsecured debt by half, to determine a 50% pay back to the unsecured
creditors if this case was under a chapter 13 plan. If there is ample funds
to pay the unsecured creditors, I send a letter (707(b)), to debtors counsel
advising him or her of the amount of disposable income.
Examine the schedules, statement of affairs, and statement of income and
expenses for evidence of the debtor's disposable income and ability to repay
a substantial percentage of debts owed over a three-year to five-year period.
This would be consistent with the concept of a "feasible Chapter 13 plan."
Paralegal reviews Statement of Expenses and Income in each case. If excess
income over living expenses is sufficient to fund a 36 month Chapter 13
plan and repay at least 50% of unsecured debt (being mostly consumer debt),
case is referred to attorney for further inquiry if necessary.
Paralegal initially screens every Chapter 7 filing and scrutinizes: (1) size
& history of income (2) amount of disposable income i.e. income available
after payment of expenses and (3) reasonableness ofproposed family budget.
The test is whether a chapter 13 case is appropriate in light of the debtor's
income expenses, and the petition debt.
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From these responses it is clear that in some areas of the country,
Chapter 13 is mandatory for individuals who have the ability to repay
their debts, provided their debts are primarily consumer debts. Yet the
standard used to determine ability to pay varies among the U.S. Trustee
Offices.
Interestingly, in some cases, the debtor is given an opportunity to convert the Chapter 7 filing to a Chapter 13 before the motion to dismiss is
filed. For example, the practice of two U.S. Trustees involves sending a
letter to attorneys of debtors who have sufficient disposable income to
fund a Chapter 13. The letter reads in part:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with an opportunity
to discuss this matter with your client in order to consider the
possibility of voluntarily converting the above captioned Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13 case. Such a conversion would eliminate the need for this office to consider a Motion to Dismiss
12 6
the Chapter 7 Case pursuant to 11 section 707(b).
One of these U.S. Trustees noted that as a result of this letter, they have
had about 3 voluntary conversions to Chapter 13. However, he also noted
that in the district there has been more Chapter 13 filings which he
attributed to the fact that "w]ord is around the Bar that U.S. Trustee is
pursuing the 707(b) provision of the Code.' 1 27 A different U.S. Trustee

estimated that their office had been successful in convincing approximately 12-15 debtors to "voluntarily" convert to Chapter 13.128
C. Future Income One Factor
A number of bankruptcy decisions have concluded that ability to repay
debts out of future income is only one of the factors which must be considered in determining whether a Chapter 7 petition should be dismissed
under section 707(b). The factors which are frequently noted and considered include:
1. whether the debtors have a likelihood of sufficient income to pay a
substantial portion of the unsecured claims;
2. whether the debtors' petition was filed as a consequence of illness,
disability, unemployment, or some other calamity;
3. whether the schedules suggest the debtors incurred cash advances
and consumer purchases in excess of their ability to pay them;
4. whether the debtors' proposed family budget is excessive or extravagant;
5. whether the debtors fully and accurately disclosed all of the relevant
financial information; and

126

Survey Responses, supra note 6.

127Id.
128 Id.
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129
6. whether the debtors have engaged in eve of bankruptcy purchases.
In many of the cases, the import of each factor in finding substantial
abuse is not clear, although ability to pay is often referred to as the
primary factor. There is a line of cases, however, which hold that ability
to pay must be coupled with some egregious circumstance or unfair advantage before the case constitutes substantial abuse. In fact, the court
in In re Keniston'31 concluded that "a substantial question regarding
possible constitutional invalidity under the equal protection clause" is
presented if the term substantial abuse is interpreted to mean merely
the ability to repay debts out of future income since only individuals with
primarily consumer debts are within the ambit of section 707(b). 3 1 The
Keniston court avoided this constitutional question by construing the
term substantial abuse to require an element of bad faith. 132 This construction was deemed appropriate after an examination of other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the legislative history of section 707(b) and
the context and history of the bankruptcy laws in general.
The court began its analysis by referring to other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. The court observed that insolvency is not a prerequisite for
bankruptcy under any chapter. 33 Moreover, 109, which defines who can
be a debtor, does not require that the debtor be insolvent or lack adequate
future income to be eligible for relief under Chapter 7.134 In addition, the
court noted that the future income of a Chapter 7 debtor is not "property
of the estate" and that section 707(a), which authorizes the court to dismiss chapter 7 petitions for cause, does not encompass dismissals based
upon the ability of the debtor to repay debts.' 3'
The court also reexamined the fundamental purpose of bankruptcyto give honest debtors a fresh start by relieving them of preexisting debts
upon the surrender of their assets. The courts placed particular emphasis
on the concerns, both public and private, which underlie this fundamental
purpose. 136 In examining the concerns, the court referred to the United

States Supreme Court decision in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt

37

wherein the

Court stated:
The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and
those dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal liberty
quite as much as, if not more, than, it is a property right. To
preserve its free exercise is of the utmost importance, not only
because it is a fundamental private necessity, but because it

29

1

In re Ploegert, 93 Bankr. 641 (Bankr. N.D.Ind. 1988); In re Kress, 57 Bankr.

874 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985);
In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
130 85 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
131

3

Id. at 212.

1 2 Id. at

213.

-3Id. at 214.
134 Id.
In re Keniston, 85 Bankr. at 214.
'3

36Id. at 215-17.
137292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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is a matter of great public concern. From the viewpoint of the
wage earner there is little difference between not earning at
all and earning wholly for a creditor. Pauperism may be the
necessary result of either, the amount of the indebtedness, or
the proportion of wages assigned, may here be small, but the
principle, once established, will equally apply where both are
very great. The new opportunity in life and the clear field for
future effort, which it is the purpose of the bankruptcy act to
afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little value to the
wage earner if he were obliged to face the necessity of devoting
the whole or a considerable portion of his earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebtedness incurred prior to his bankruptcy. 38
The bankruptcy court then turned to the specific legislative history of
section 707(b). After reviewing the circumstances that surrounded the
enactment of section 707(b), with particular attention to the fact that a
future income test in earlier versions of the bill was deleted in favor of
the term substantial abuse, the court stated:
The crucial ambiguity as to the "substantial abuse" language
...is that the enactment followed a clear stand-off between
the forces that wanted to preserve the historically entrenched
concept of a fresh start for Chapter 7 debtors under our bankruptcy laws, as opposed to the forces reacting to the consumer
credit industry's complaint that consumer debtors were abus1 39
ing the Bankruptcy Code.

The court then concluded that "[o]ne thing that is not ambiguous is that
Congress did defeat the attempt to impose a threshold future income test
as a qualification for [C]hapter 7 relief for consumer debtors.."140 This

rejection, according to the court, is a "strong point" for reading substantial
4
abuse to require more than ability to pay.' '
The court also referred to the principal of statutory construction which
discourages courts from reversing well-established judicially-created
principles when a statute is ambiguous, and deduced that if Congress had
intended to overturn the fresh start concept with section 707(b), this
intention would have been expressly stated. 142 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that Congress would have removed the dollar ceilings established for the amount of debt to be eligible for Chapter 13 and foreclosed
these debtors from Chapter 11 had Congress meant for Chapter 7 petitions
to be dismissed for substantial abuse on the basis of the debtor's ability
4
to fund a Chapter 13 plan.

3

'"Id.at 245, quoted in In re Keniston, 85 Bankr. 202, 216 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1988).
139
In re

Keniston, 85 Bankr. at 218.

140Id.
1 Id. at 219.
1
12 Id at 219-22.
"3Id.at 222.
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In deciding that the ability to pay must be coupled with some egregious
circumstances or unfair advantage before constituting substantial abuse,
the court acknowledged that section 707(b) is not essentially different
from the court's power to dismiss a case for bad faith or abuse of the
bankruptcy process.'4 Nevertheless, the court found this to be a permissible conclusion in light of the indeterminate legislative history.145
Consequently, the court refused to dismiss the Chapter 7 petition in
this case because although debtor was able to pay his debts from future
income, there was no evidence of egregious circumstances or unfair ad46

vantage.1

Other courts have taken this same approach. In the case of In re
Deaton147 the debtors could "comfortably support" a Chapter 13 plan yet
the court refused to consider dismissing the petitions because the "mere
ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan is not sufficient to constitute 'substantial
abuse'."'148 The court in In re Shands149 stated that an ability to pay 100%
within three years when coupled with some egregious circumstances warrants dismissal for substantial abuse of Chapter 7.110 This court then
dismissed the case finding that the debtor could pay all her debts within
thirty-three months and that the debtor had filed for bankruptcy to spite
her former husband.15'
The bankruptcy court in In re Wegner 52 professed to adopt this view.
However, the overriding consideration in this case was that the debtors
were ineligible for relief under Chapter 13 and 11. Chapter 13 was unavailable because the debtors' noncontingent, unliquidated, unsecured
debts exceeded the statutory limit of $100,000.'15

Chapter 11 was fore-

closed to the debtors because they were not engaged in a business. 54 Had
'4In re Keniston, 85 Bankr. at 223-25. As a result, the court concluded that
§ 707(b) does not violate the equal protection clause since individual debtors with
primarily consumer debts are not treated any differently than other debtors.
14Id.
146Id.

at 229.

Bankr. 663, 665 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
4 Id. at 666.
14963 Bankr. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).

14765

Id. at 124.
Id. The only debts that would not have been repaid were a small claim owed
to Consumers Power Company and a substantial claim to her former husband.
Moreover, the debtor testified that her "main purpose" in seeking bankruptcy
relief was to discharge the debt owed to her ex-husband. Id. at 123-24.
5

1291 Bankr. 854 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).

11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) provides:
Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing
of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than
$100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000,
or an individual with regular income and such individual's spouse, except
a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of the filing of
the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less
than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
$350,000 may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.
11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e)(West 1979).
'"4See, e.g., Wamsganz v. Boatmen's Bank of De Soto, 804 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that Chapter 11 is only available to debtors engaged in business).
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either Chapter 11 or 13 been available to the debtors, the court would
15
have dismissed the case as substantial abuse. However, because the
court felt that the debtors would never recover financially without some
form of bankruptcy relief, the court refused to dismiss the Chapter 7
case. 156 The anomalous result was noted by the court: "[i]f the debtors
had incurred debts within the chapter 13 limits, they would be forced to
pay some of their debts. But because they were greater spendthrifts, they
a new axiom that pigs are put on
will be discharged. This demonstrates
15 7
a diet but hogs are set free.'

In the survey, a few courts indicated that Chapter 7 cases are screened
using a variety of factors. For example, one court indicated that the
considerations for initiation of inquiry as to section 707(b) include:
(1) more than $30,000 income for either of two preceding years;
(2) debtor has assets without regard to debt, of $200,000 or more;
(3) debtor has more than $250 net monthly available income (or debt
load of less than $9,000); and
58
(4) debtor has been granted a Chapter 7 discharge within six years.'
Another court utilizes a checklist in instances when it appears the
case should be dismissed pursuant to section 707(b). Among the questions
on the checklist are:
(1) the amount of medical debts;
(2) the amount and dates of last charges on credit card and revolving
accounts;
(3) the number of car loans;
(4) the number of boat or recreational vehicle loans;
(5) whether the debtor incurred cash allowances or made consumer
purchases far in excess of ability to pay;
(6) the amount of disposable income and whether it is calculated correctly;
(7) whether the debtor's proposed budget is excessive or unreasonable;
(8) whether the debtor is capable of paying all or part of his debts
under a Chapter 13 plan without undue hardship;
(9) whether the debtor has suffered a calamity such as unemployment,
disability, illness; and
159
(10) a description of the debts the debtor intends to reaffirm.
A third court has taken a less formal approach. This court indicated
that in keeping with the fresh start doctrine, it takes into consideration
the good faith and best efforts of the debtors, the integrity and accuracy
80
of schedules along with debtors monthly net income. Again, as in many
5 91 Bankr. 854, 857-60 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
Id. at 859-60.

15

Id. at 859 n.12. The court invited the U.S. Trustee to appeal the decision to
enable the circuit court to rethink its position in Wamsganz. Id. It is significant
that the decision in Wegner was reached prior to the Eighth Circuit's holding in
Walton. Whether Walton compels a different result is yet to be resolved.
Survey Responses, supra note 6.
158
159

Id.

160 Id.
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of the court decisions, the significance of the various factors is not specified. At least one court requires an indication of egregious conduct before
raising the issue of substantial abuse. The court stated that it has only
held section 707(b) hearings when "the statement of income and expenses
filed by the debtor were such that it shocked the conscience of the
[c]ourt."161

With regard to the U.S. Trustees, twenty-five percent of those that
responded to the survey stated that they rely on multiple factors in screening Chapter 7 petitions for substantial abuse. 162 In addition to ability to
repay unsecured claims, factors considered by the trustees include: multiple filings to "stall" foreclosures; multiple credit card debts; reaffirmation of debts secured by expensive personal property; venue shopping;
criminal activity; prior filings; high attorney fees; debtor's motivation for
filing; asset/no asset status; forthrightness of the debtor in completing
the schedules; gambling losses; and debtor's cooperation with the trustee
1 63
in administering the estate.

D. Without a Future Income Test
In addition to holding that a debtor's ability to pay his debts will justify
dismissal under section 707(b), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
case of In re Kelly'r in dictum commented, "[t]his is not to say that
inability to pay will shield a debtor from section 707(b) dismissal where
bad faith is otherwise shown."'165 The 1986 case of In re Bruno166 was such
a case. In Bruno, the debtor was convicted of the murder of his wife and
filed a Chapter 7 petition for the discharge of her funeral bills. The court
stated that the purpose of section 707(b) was "to prevent the use of the
Bankruptcy Code to promote injustice in any form,' '1 67 and concluded that

"[b]ankruptcy has too grand and lofty a purpose to allow debtors to gain
freedom from indebtedness ...

incurred as a result of their crimes."'

In a few decisions, section 707(b) has been mentioned to induce debtors
6 9
to comply with a court order. In In re Helvig,1
the debtor willfully violated
a court order that required the debtor to return a chiropractic practice
to the seller. Along with ordering the debtor to comply with the court
order, the court stated that failure to comply would result in the dismissal
of the petition under section 707(b) or an order denying the debtor a
discharge under section 727(a)(6)(A). 17 0 In In re Warfield,17 1 the court was

161Id.
16 2

1d.

163Survey Responses, supra note 6.
1-841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
165 Id. at 915.
16668 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
167 1d. at 103.
168Id.
16'9

74 Bankr. 204 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987).
207.
80 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).

170Id. at
171
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actually deciding whether to dismiss the case for substantial abuse. After
reaffirming its position that there must be evidence of bad faith to establish substantial abuse, the court noted that "[wihile we are satisfied
that debtors in the present case were not engaged in a purposeful exercise
prior to filing bankruptcy to defeat creditors through use of the bankruptcy process, we cannot say that the record presented totally dispels
our concerns about bad faith." 172 Consequently, the court decided that
Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief would be afforded if the debtors met the
following conditions:
1. Secure counseling in household budgeting, supplying evidence to us
within thirty days of the date of this order that they have done so,
or are in the process of doing so;
2. Submit to the court, by the tenth day after the end of each calendar
month for the six months following the date of this order, a record
of their actual household income and expenses. This is to be in the
form of a sworn statement by debtors; and
3. Refrain from making purchases on credit or otherwise incurring
voluntary indebtedness unless approved by the court, for the sixmonth period following the date of this order, and so certify to the
73

court at the end of that period.1

However, the court made it clear that the section 707(b) motion would
only be withdrawn if the debtors comply with these conditions and if their
actual budgets appear reasonable and indicative of a lifestyle within their
means. 174

It would seem likely that the courts and the U.S. Trustees which are
screening Chapter 7 petitions on the basis of a variety of factors would
discover instances of substantial abuse even when the petitioner does not
have the ability to repay creditors. However, if the petitions are screened
only on the basis of ability to pay, other abuses may be overlooked. This
shortcoming was recognized by Chief Judge Stewart who indicated that
Chapter 7 petitions were screened for abuses other than the ability to
pay, such as the attempt to discharge liabilities created by criminal conduct or an attempt to discharge liabilities for luxuries within a short time
1 76
before bankruptcy.

1 75

A few of the U.S. Trustees also made this point.

Interestingly, responses from two U.S. Trustees indicated that they would
cases for criminal activity and working with the
be screening Chapter 71 77
FBI when appropriate.

Id. at 900.
173 Id. at 900-01. The court also quipped that "[iut would not be amiss for both
debtors to take a cooking course, including instruction in microwave cookery."
Id. at 901.
174 Id. at 902.
172

Survey
175
17
Id.
177Id.

Responses, supra note 6.

6
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VI. UTILIZATION

As was anticipated, the survey results reveal that the frequency of use
of section 707(b) motions varies significantly between the bankruptcy
districts.' 78 The findings reveal a few judges have been quite active in
pursuing dismissals for substantial abuse while others have never exercised their standing to bring motions and have no plans to do so.' 79 The

responses from the U.S. Trustees also vary greatly, while some trustees
have never made a motion under section 707(b), other have initiated more
than 50.180 Although some of this disparity can be attributed to other
factors such as regional economic downturns and judicial activeness, the
primary cause appears to be the non-uniform procedures and guidelines
utilized by the U.S. Trustees in screening chapter 7 petitions for substantial abuse. 181
VII. CONCLUSION

The analysis of law and the reality of the implementation of section
707(b) demonstrates the critical need for Congress to resolve the issues
raised by the section. To solve the problems created by section 707(b) and
at the same time address the concerns which prompted its enactment,
the authors recommend that section 707(b) be repealed and section
707(a)18 2 be revised to allow the court to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for "bad
faith."
Section 707(a) provides that the court may dismiss a Chapter 7 case
for cause. The text of section 707(a) reads as follows:
The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after
notice and a hearing and only for cause, including(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to
creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28; and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within
fifteen days or such additional time as the court may
allow after the filing of the petition commencing such
case, the information required by paragraph (1) of section
521, but only on a motion by the United States trustee.'

178
179

Id.

ld.

- Survey Responses, supra note 6.
is,
182

Id.
11

U.S.C.A. § 707(a) (West Supp. 1987).

193Id.
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Although the causes listed in the statute are merely illustrative, not
exhaustive,' 184 the courts have uniformly refused to consider the debtor's
ability to pay as a basis for cause.18 5 This construction stems from the
legislative history. Both the House and the Senate Report stated, "[section
707(a)] does not contemplate ...that the ability of the debtor to repay
1 86
his debts in whole or in part constitutes adequate cause for dismissal.'
This position was taken because Congress felt that to allow otherwise
would be to enact a non-uniform Chapter 13.187
Yet six years later, the compelling force behind the enactment of section
707(b) was that consumer debtors with the ability to repay their debts
were taking advantage of bankruptcy. There is no question that Congress
intended that the ability to pay would be a component of substantial
abuse.' However, since there is no statutory definition of substantial
abuse and the legislative intent is ambiguous and confusing, the courts
are divided as to its meaning, with a majority of courts equating substantial abuse to the ability to pay. 8 9 The conflict between the courts is
further exacerbated because the U.S. Trustees are screening and identifying potential cases of substantial abuse utilizing different procedures
and standards, creating a wide disparity in the cases which are brought
to the attention of the court. The result of the interpretation and implementation of section 707(b) is a non-uniform mandatory Chapter 13.
The authors believe that in enacting section 707(b), Congress did not
intend this result.'90 The "future income test" should be rejected as the
exclusive measure of substantial abuse because such a definition causes
the basic structure of our bankruptcy system to change from being assetbased to being income-based. 191 A fundamental principal of our bank19 2
ruptcy laws has been to provide debtors with a "fresh start."' This fresh
start policy "gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor, who surrenders
for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future efforts unhampered
13
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."' Chapter 7

114S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 94 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th

Cong., 1st Sess.-380 (1977). Chapter 7 cases have been dismissed under § 707(a)
for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., In re Brown, 88 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1988).
I"See, e.g., In re Frisch, 76 Bankr. 801 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987).

8 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 94 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 380 (1977).
1971d.

& accompanying text.
188
99-177 & accompanying text.
notes 88-98
See supra
supra notes
11 See

- Wells and Kurtz, supra note 4, at 417.
19,Id.

192E.g., Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55
(1915); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934).
193
Id.
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effectuates this policy by granting a discharge of the debtor's prepetition
liabilities upon the surrender of nonexempt assets.1 9 4 The bankruptcy law
specifies no entry-level requirements for Chapter 7 such as insolvency or
inability to pay debts. 195 Equating substantial abuse with ability to pay
eviscerates the fresh start policy by either forcing debtors into Chapter
13 or denying them bankruptcy protection. Had Congress intended such
a dramatic change in the foundation of the bankruptcy laws, the statutory
language or legislative intent would have been clear. The authors believe
that through section 707(b), Congress merely wanted to provide the court
with a mechanism to dismiss cases that were shocking to its conscience.
This legislative purpose could be accomplished by adding bad faith to
the list of causes set forth in section 707(a).196 As revised then, a court
could dismiss a Chapter 7 case under section 707(a) when the ability of
the debtor to repay debts is coupled with some egregious circumstances.
By adopting this approach, the concerns which prompted the enactment
of section 707(b) are addressed without defining the term substantial
abuse. This is significant since at the time section 707(b) was enacted,
Congress could not agree upon a definition and it seems unlikely that a
consensus could be reached today. On the other hand, a bill which allows
the court to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition on the basis of bad faith should
encounter little opposition.
This solution also resolves the procedural issues created by section
707(b). An initial question raised by section 707(b) is whether the courts
and U.S. Trustees should screen Chapter 7 petitions since only the court
and the U.S. Trustee could move to dismiss for substantial abuse. Under
the proposed solution, the court and U.S. Trustee would not screen Chapter 7 petitions for bad faith, however when the court or U.S. Trustee
perceive bad faith on the part of the debtor, they would be permitted to
move for dismissal. Additionally, parties in interest would have standing
to bring motions to dismiss. 9 7 In enacting section 707(b), Congress rejected this approach because of concerns that creditors would routinely
move for dismissals, thereby burdening debtors with the additional expense and time involved in demonstrating that Chapter 7 relief is appropriate. However, as section 707(b) is currently being implemented,
virtually every Chapter 7 petition is being scrutinized for substantial
abuse. It seems unlikely that debtors would face more motions for dismissal under the proposed approach. Moreover, the court may impose
sanctions on creditors who use section 707(a) as a way to harass debtors.198
1 11 U.S.C.A. § 727 (West 1979 & Supp. 1990).
19511 U.S.C.A. § 109(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1990).
9 Section 707(a) would provide:
The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a
hearing and only for cause, including(4) bad faith.
With the exception of § 707(a)(3), § 707(a) presupposes motions for dismissal
197

by the court, trustees, creditors or other parties in interest and the courts without

question have entertained such motions. See, e.g., In re Fischer, 72 Bankr. 111,
1139(Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
I Bankr. R. 9011 authorizes the court to impose sanctions, including costs and
attorney's fees, on creditors who file motions for the purpose of harassing debtors.
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An additional advantage of shifting the primary responsibility for identifying substantial abuse to creditors is that the policing of bad faith will
be by those most interested in the outcome of the case. Allowing parties
in interest to move for dismissal also disposes of the issue as to whether
the court or U.S. Trustee could make a motion to dismiss following a
suggestion or request of a party in interest.
The constitutional challenges based on the equal protection clause are
also eliminated in the proposed solution. While section 707(b) applies
only if the debtor's debts are primarily consumer debts, a Chapter 7
petition could be dismissed on the basis of bad faith regardless of the type
of debts. 19s

Until Congress clarifies the law, the authors suggest that both the
courts and the U.S. Trustees refrain from screening Chapter 7 petitions
for substantial abuse. While the courts for the most part are not screening
Chapter 7 cases, the U.S. Trustees have interpreted section 707(b) as a
mandate to screen Chapter 7 petitions. As such, practically every Chapter
7 petition is being examined by the U.S. Trustee for evidence of substantial abuse. The result is that the U.S. Trustees have effectuated a
non-uniform mandatory Chapter 13. As discussed above, the authors feel
that this outcome is contrary to Congressional intent. There is no screening process provided for in the statute. Furthermore, section 707(b) motions were initially limited to the court because of concerns that creditors
would routinely move for dismissal making bankruptcy too costly and
time consuming for debtors. In 1986, the U.S. Trustees were given standing to make motions under section 707(b) simply because some courts
had held that they were parties in interest and thus precluded from
making such motions. As currently implemented, however, it seems likely
that debtors face more motions for dismissal than if creditors had been
empowered to initiate such motions. In the authors' opinion, Congress
envisioned that section 707(b) would be utilized only when the possibility
of flagrant abuse became evident during the administration of the case.
This leads to the final issue raised in the implementation of section
707(b): Should the court or U.S. Trustee make a motion to dismiss after
a party in interest has suggested that the case constitutes substantial
abuse? The authors have taken the position that a suggestion or motion
by a creditor should not foreclose the court or U.S. Trustee from making
an independent examination of the case and then if appropriate move for
dismissal. 20 0 Although this solution is in conflict with specific statements
in the legislative history, it does not defeat the purpose which prompted
Congress to include the prohibition against a creditor raising the issue:

199 The proposed solution is also appealing because it codifies the requirement
faith in Chapter 7 cases. Although the courts have held that good faith
good
of
is an implicit jurisdictional requirement of bankruptcy, the proposed solution will
establish a statutory basis for good faith.
200Wells and Kurtz, supra note 4, at 395.
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that creditors would harass debtors and make bankruptcy too expensive.
The independent investigation into the case assures that creditors cannot
use section 707(b) to harass debtors in Chapter 7. Moreover, a debtor
should not be granted relief under Chapter 7 when the case constitutes
substantial abuse simply because a creditor has suggested dismissal under section 707(b).
The recommendations to the court and U.S. Trustee will solve some of
the issues raised by section 707(b); however, they are not substitutes for
Congressional action. The time for action is now, once Congress can effectively remedy the serious problems in the bankruptcy system created
by section 707(b).

APPENDIX
BANKRUPTCY COURT SURVEY
If the Court is currently using monthly net income as its guideline for
issuing show cause orders on substantial abuse, please respond to PART
I (i.e., questions 1-7). Otherwise, please turn to PART II (i.e., questions
8-13).
PART I
1. a. The guideline for single debtors is $
monthly net income.
b. The guideline for married debtors is $
monthly net income.
c. For each dependent, $
monthly net income is added to the
guideline.
d. Additional Comments:
2. Does the Court consider any factors in addition to net income, before
issuing a show cause order?
No

Yes; Please explain.
3. Why did the Court decide to use monthly net income as the basis for
its guidelines?
4. How did the Court determine the dollar amounts used in the guidelines?
5. How often will the guidelines be reviewed?
Annually
Quarterly
Other; Please specify.
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6. This response is from the
of

47

district in the state

7. Any additional comments concerning the use of guidelines, such as
problems or concerns that have arisen, success that has resulted,
would be appreciated.
PART II
8. Has the Court implemented a screening process to identify possible
substantial abuse in Chapter 7 cases?
___ No
Yes; Please describe the process currently employed by
the Court.
9. If no screening process is utilized, has the court considered establishing guidelines?
10. If a screening process is employed, why did the Court decide to utilize
this particular procedure?
11. If a screening process is utilized, how often will it be reviewed?
Annually
Quarterly
Other; Please specify.
12. This response is from the
of

district in the state

13. Any additional comments concerning the use of guidelines, such as
problems or concerns that have arisen, success that has resulted,
would be appreciated.

U.S. TRUSTEE SURVEY
IMPLEMENTATION OF § 707(b)
1. Has the Trustee implemented a screening process to identify possible
substantial abuse in Chapter 7 cases?
___

No

Yes; Please describe the process currently employed.
2. If no screening process is utilized, has the Trustee considered establishing guidelines?
3. If a screening process is employed, why did the Trustee decide to
utilize this particular procedure?
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4. If a screening process is utilized, how often will it be reviewed?
Annually
Quarterly
Other; Please specify.
5. If a creditor brings the possibility of substantial abuse to the attention
of the Trustee,
___

The Trustee conducts an independent investigation to de-

termine if a motion to dismiss should be made.
____

The Trustee will not make a motion to dismiss after the issue

has been raised by a creditor.
Other; Please explain.
6. Who has raised the issue of substantial abuse?
only Trustee

only Court

__

both

Trustee and Court
7. Approximately how many times has the Trustee made a motion to
dismiss under § 707(b)?
8. Approximately how many times have the Courts in your region made
a motion to dismiss under § 707(b)?
9. This response is from region

in the state of

10. Any additional comments concerning § 707(b), such as problems or
concerns that have arisen, success that has resulted, would be appreciated.
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